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Yaron Velner
The Blavatnik School of Computer Science, Tel Aviv University, Israel
Abstract. We consider infinite duration alternating move games. These
games were previously studied by Roth, Balcan, Kalai and Mansour [10].
They presented an FPTAS for computing an approximate equilibrium,
and conjectured that there is a polynomial algorithm for finding an exact
equilibrium [9]. We extend their study in two directions: (1) We show that
finding an exact equilibrium, even for two-player zero-sum games, is poly-
nomial time equivalent to finding a winning strategy for a (two-player)
mean-payoff game on graphs. The existence of a polynomial algorithm
for the latter is a long standing open question in computer science. Our
hardness result for two-player games suggests that two-player alternat-
ing move games are harder to solve than two-player simultaneous move
games, while the work of Roth et al., suggests that for k ≥ 3, k-player
games are easier to analyze in the alternating move setting. (2) We show
that optimal equilibria (with respect to the social welfare metric) can be
obtained by pure strategies, and we present an FPTAS for computing a
pure approximated equilibrium that is δ-optimal with respect to the so-
cial welfare metric. This result extends the previous work by presenting
an FPTAS that finds a much more desirable approximated equilibrium.
We also show that if there is a polynomial algorithm for mean-payoff
games on graphs, then there is a polynomial algorithm that computes an
optimal exact equilibrium, and hence, (two-player) mean-payoff games
on graphs are inter-reducible with k-player alternating move games, for
any k ≥ 2.
1 Introduction
In this work, we investigate infinitely repeated games in which players alternate
making moves. This framework can model, for example, five telecommunication
providers competing for customers: each company can observe the price that is
set by the others, and it can update the price at any time. In the short term,
each company can benefit from undercutting its opponents price, but since the
game is repeated indefinitely, in some settings, it might be better to coordinate
prices with the other companies. Such examples motivate us to study equilibria
in alternating move games.
In this work, we study infinitely repeated k-player n-action games. In such
games, in every round, a player chooses an action, and the utility of each player
(for the current round) is determined according to the k-tuple of actions of the
players. Each player goal is to maximize his own long-run average utility as the
number of rounds tends to infinity.
These games were studied by Roth et al. in [10], and they showed an FPTAS
for computing an ǫ-equilibrium. Their result provided a theoretical separation
between the alternating move model and the simultaneous move model, since
for the latter, it is known that an FPTAS for computing approximate equilibria
does not exists for games with k ≥ 3 players unless P=PPAD. Their result was
obtained by a simple reduction to mean-payoff games on graphs. These games
were presented in [5], and they play an important rule in automata theory and
in economics. The computational complexity of finding an exact equilibrium for
such games is a long standing open problem, and despite many efforts [1–3,6,7,
12], there is no known polynomial solution for this problem.
We extend the work in [10] by investigating the complexity of an exact equi-
librium (which was stated as an open question in [10]), and by investigating
the computational complexity of finding an δ-optimal approximated equilibrium
with respect to the social welfare metric. Our main technical results are as fol-
lows:
– We show a reduction from mean-payoff games on graphs to two-player zero-
sum alternating move games, and thus we prove that k-player alternating
move games are computationally equivalent to mean-payoff games on graphs
for any k ≥ 2.
– We show that optimal equilibrium can be obtained by pure strategies, and
we show an FPTAS for computing an δ-optimal ǫ-equilibrium. In addition,
we show that computing an exact optimal equilibrium is polynomial time
equivalent to solving mean-payoff games on graphs.
We note that the first result may suggest that two-player alternating move games
are harder than two-player simultaneous move games, since a polynomial time
algorithm to solve the latter is known [8]. Hence, along with the result of [10],
we get that simultaneous move games are easier to solve with comparison to
alternating move games for two-player games, and are harder to solve for k ≥ 3
player games.
This paper is organized as following. In the next section we bring formal
definitions for alternating move games and mean-payoff games on graphs. In
Section 3, we show that alternating move games are at least as hard as mean-
payoff games on graphs. In Section 4 we investigate the properties of optimal
equilibria, and we present an FPTAS for computing an δ-optimal ǫ-equilibrium.
Due to lack of space, some of the proofs were omitted, and the full proofs are
given in the appendix.
2 Definitions
In this section we bring the formal definitions for alternating move repeated
games and mean-payoff games on graphs. Alternating move games are presented
in Subsection 2.1, and mean-payoff games are presented in Subsection 2.2.
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2.1 Alternating move repeated games
Actions, plays and utility function. A k-player n-action game is defined
by an action set Ai for every player i, and by k utility functions, one for each
player, ui : A1 × . . . Ak → [−1, 1]. W.l.o.g we assume that the size of all action
set is the same, and we denote it by n. We note that any game can be rescaled
so its utilities are bounded in [−1, 1], however, the FPTAS that was presented
in [10], and our results in Subsection 4.4 crucially rely on the assumption that
the utilities are in the interval [−1, 1].
An alternating move game is played for infinitely many rounds. In round t
player j = 1+(t mod k) plays action atj , and a vector of actions a
t = (a1, . . . , ak)
is produced, where ai ∈ Ai is the last action of player i. In every round t, player
i receives a utility ui(a
t), which depends only in the last action of each of the
k players (W.l.o.g the utility in the first k rounds is zero for all players). A
sequence of infinite rounds forms a play, and we characterize a play either by
an infinite sequence of actions or by the corresponding sequence of vectors of
actions. The utility of player i in a play a1a2 . . . atat+1 . . . is the limit average
payoff, namely, limn→∞
1
n
∑n
t=1 ui(a
t). When this limit does not exist, we define
the utility of the play for player i to be lim infn→∞
1
n
∑n
t=1 ui(a
t). We note
that in the frame work of [10], the utility of a play was undefined when the
limit does not exist. The results we present in this paper for the lim inf metric
holds also for the framework of [10]. On the other hand, if we would take the
lim sup value instead, then the problem is much easier. An optimal equilibrium is
obtained when all players join forces and maximize player 1+(i (mod k)) utility
for 2i rounds (for i = 1, 2, . . . ,∞). Hence, we can easily produce a polynomial
algorithm to solve these games.
Strategies. A strategy is a recipe for player’s next action, based on the entire
history of previous actions. Formally, a (mixed) strategy for player i is a function
σi : (A1 × · · · × Ak)
∗ × A1 × · · · × Ai−1 → ∆(Ai), where ∆(S) denotes the set
probability distribution over any finite set S. We say that σi is a pure strategy
if ∆ is a degenerated distribution. A strategy profile is a vector σ = (σ1, . . . , σk)
that defines a strategy for every player. A profile of pure strategies uniquely
determines the action vector in every round and yields a utility vector for the
players. A profile of mixed strategies determines, for every round t in the play,
a distribution of sequences of action vectors, and the average payoff in round t
is the expected average payoff over the distribution of action vectors. Formally,
for a strategy profile σ we denote the average payoff of player i in round t by
Pi,t(σ) = Ea1a2...at∼σ[
ui(a
1) + · · ·+ ui(a
t)
t
]
and the utility of player i is lim inft→∞ Pi,t.
Equilibria, ǫ equilibria and optimal equilibria A strategy profile forms an
equilibrium if none of the players can strictly improve his utility (that is induced
by the profile) by unilaterally deviating from his strategy (that is defined by the
profile). For every ǫ > 0, we say that a strategy profile forms an ǫ-equilibrium
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if none of the players can improve his utility by more than ǫ by unilaterally
deviating from his strategy.
The social welfare of a strategy profile is the sum of the utilities of all players.
An equilibrium (resp. an ǫ-equilibrium) is called an optimal equilibrium (opti-
mal ǫ-equilibrium) if its social welfare is not smaller than the social welfare of
any other equilibrium (ǫ-equilibrium). For δ > 0, an equilibrium (resp. an ǫ-
equilibrium) is called an δ-optimal equilibrium if its social welfare is not smaller
by more than δ with comparison to the social welfare of any other equilibrium
(ǫ-equilibrium).
2.2 Mean-payoff games on graphs
Plays and payoffs. A mean-payoff game on a graph is defined by a weighted
directed bipartite graph G = (V = V1 ∪ V2, E, w : E → Q) and an initial vertex
v0 ∈ V . The game consists of two players, namely, maximizer (who owns V1) and
minimizer (who owns V2). Initially, a pebble is place on the initial vertex, and in
every round, the player who owns the vertex in which the pebble resides, advance
the pebble into an adjacent vertex. This process is repeated forever and forms a
play. A play is characterized by a sequence of edges, and the average payoff of a
play ρ = e1 . . . et up to round t is denoted by Pt =
1
t
∑
i=1 w(ei). The value of a
play is the limit average payoff (mean-payoff), namely, lim inft→∞ Pt. (We note
that for games on graphs, the lim sup metric gives the same complexity results.)
The objective of the maximizer is to maximize the mean-payoff of a play, and
the minimizer aims to minimize the mean-payoff.
Strategies, memoryless strategies, optimal strategies and winning strate-
gies. In this work, we consider only pure strategies for games on graphs, and
it is well-known that randomization does not give better strategies for mean-
payoff games. A strategy for maximizer is a function σ : (V1 × V2)
∗ × V1 → E
that decides the next move, and similarly, for the minimizer a strategy is a func-
tion τ : (V1 × V2)
∗ → E. A strategy is called memoryless if it depends only
on the current position of the pebble. Formally, a memoryless strategy for the
maximizer is a function σ : V1 → E and similarly a memoryless strategy for the
minimizer is a function τ : V2 → E.
A profile of strategies (σ, τ) uniquely determines the mean-payoff value of
a game. We say that a play π = e1e2 . . . en . . . is consistent with a maximizer
strategy σ if there exists a minimizer strategy τ such that π is formed by (σ, τ).
We say that the value of a maximizer strategy is p if it can assure a value of
at least p against any minimizer strategy. Analogously, we say that the value
of a minimizer strategy is p if it can assure a value of at most p against any
maximizer strategy.
We say that a maximizer strategy is optimal if its value is maximal (with
respect to all possible maximizer strategies). Analogously, a minimizer strategy
is optimal if its value is minimal. For a given threshold, we say that a maximizer
strategy is a winning strategy if it assures mean-payoff value that is greater or
equal to the given threshold, and a minimizer strategy is winning if it assures
value that is strictly smaller than the given threshold.
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One-player games, and games according to memoryless strategies A
special (and easier) case of games on graphs is when the out-degree is one for all
the vertices that are owned by a certain player. In this case, all the choices are
done by one player. For a two-player game on graph G, and a player-1 strategy
σ, we define the one-player game graph Gσ to be the game graph that is formed
by removing, for every player-1 vertex v, the out-edges that are not equal to
σ(v).
Classical results on mean-payoff games. Mean-payoff games were intro-
duced in ’79 by Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski [5], and their main result was that
optimal strategies (for both players) exist, and moreover, the optimal value can
be obtained by a memoryless strategy. The decision problem for mean-payoff
games is to determine if the maximizer has a winning strategy with respect to
a given threshold. The existence of optimal memoryless strategies almost imme-
diately proves that the decision problem for mean-payoff games is in NP∩coNP,
and thus it is unlikely to be NP-hard (or coNP-hard). Zwick and Paterson [12]
introduced the first pseudo-polynomial algorithm, which runs in polynomial time
when the weights of the edges are encoded in unary. They also provided a poly-
nomial algorithm for the special case of one-player mean-payoff games. A ran-
domized sub-exponential algorithm for mean-payoff games is also known [2], but
despite many efforts, the existence of a polynomial algorithm to solve mean-
payoff games remains an open question, and it is one of the rare problems in
computer science that is known to be in NP∩coNP but no polynomial algorithm
is known.
We summarize the known results on mean-payoff games in the next theorems.
The first theorem states that optimal strategies exist and moreover, there exist
optimal strategies that are memoryless.
Theorem 1 ( [5]) For every mean-payoff game there exists a maximizer mem-
oryless strategy σ and a minimizer memoryless strategy τ such that σ is optimal
for the maximizer and τ is optimal for the minimizer.
The next theorem shows that there is a polynomial algorithm that computes
optimal strategies if and only if there is a polynomial algorithm for the mean-
payoff games decision problem.
Theorem 2 ( [12]) The following problems are polynomial time inter-reducible:
(i) Compute maximizer optimal memoryless strategy. (ii) Compute the optimal
value that maximizer can assure. (iii) Determine whether maximizer optimal
value is at least zero. (iv) Determine whether maximizer optimal value is greater
than zero.
3 Two-Player Zero-Sum (Alternating Move) Games are
Inter-Reducible with Mean-Payoff Games
In this section we prove that there is a polynomial algorithm that computes an
exact equilibrium for two-player zero-sum (alternating move) games if and only
if there exists a polynomial algorithm that solves mean-payoff games.
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The reduction from two-player zero-sum games to mean-payoff games is triv-
ial, for a two-player zero-sum game with actions A1, A2 and utility functions
u1 : A1×A2 → Q and u2 = −u1, we construct a complete bipartite game graph
G = (V = A1∪A2, E = (A1×A2)∪ (A2×A1), w : E → Q) such that the weight
of the transition from a1 ∈ A1 to a2 ∈ A2 is simply u1(a1, a2), and the weight of
the transition from a2 to a1 is also u1(a1, a2). It is a simple observation that a
pair of optimal strategies (for the maximizer and minimizer) in the mean-payoff
game induces an equilibrium strategy profile in the two-player zero-sum game
and vice versa.
The reduction for the converse direction is more complicated. For this purpose
we bring the notion of undirected game graph. A mean-payoff game graph is said
to be undirected if its edge relation is symmetric, and w(v1, v2) = w(v2, v1) for
every edge (v1, v2). (Basically, it is a game on an undirected graph.) The next
simple lemma shows a reduction from mean-payoff games on a complete bipartite
undirected graphs to two-player zero-sum game.
Lemma 1 There is a polynomial reduction from mean-payoff games on complete
bipartite undirected graphs to two-player zero-sum games.
Proof. The proof is straight forward. Let V1 and V2 be the maximizer and mini-
mizer (resp.) vertices in the mean-payoff game. We construct a two-player zero-
sum game in the following way. The set of action of player 1 is A1 = V2 and
the set of action for player 2 is A2 = V1. We denote by W the least value for
which all the weights in the undirected graphs are in [−W,+W ], and the utility
function of player 1 is u1(a1, a2) =
w(a1,a2)
W
= w(a2,a1)
W
, and u2 = −u1. It is
trivial to observe that an equilibrium profile induces a pair of optimal strategies
for the mean-payoff game, and the proof follows. ⊓⊔
Due to Lemma 1, all that is left is to prove that mean-payoff games on
complete bipartite undirected graphs are equivalent to mean-payoff games. A
recent result by Chatterjee, Henzinger, Krinninger and Nanongkai [4] gives us
the first step towards such proof.
Theorem 3 (Corollary 24 in [4]) Solving mean-payoff games on complete bi-
partite (directed) graphs is as hard as solving mean-payoff games on arbitrary
graphs.
We use the above result as a black box and extend it to complete bipartite
undirected graphs. We note that the main difference between directed and undi-
rected graphs is that for undirected graphs the weight function is symmetric.
In the rest of this section we will describe a process that for a given complete
bipartite directed graph, generates a suitable symmetric weight function, and
the winner in the generated graph is the same as in the original graph.
We say that a directed game graph has a normalized weight function if it
assigns a positive weight to every out-edge of maximizer vertex, and a negative
weight for every out-edge of minimizer vertex. The next lemma shows that we
may assume w.l.o.g that a directed game graph has a normalized weight function.
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Lemma 2 Solving mean-payoff games on (directed) bipartite graphs is polyno-
mial time inter-reducible to solving mean-payoff games on (directed) bipartite
graphs with normalized weights.
Proof. Let G be a non-normalized graph and let us denote by W the heaviest
weight (in absolute value) that is assigned by its weight function w. We construct
a normalized graph G′ from G by defining a weight function w′ as:
w′(u, v) =
{
w(u, v) + (W + 1) if u is owned by maximizer
w(u, v)− (W + 1) otherwise (if u is owned by the minimizer)
Clearly, G′ is a normalized graph, and since G′ and G are bipartite, it is straight
forward to observe that for any finite path in π we have that |w(π) − w′(π)| ≤
W+1, and thus, for every infinite path ρ, we have that that mean-payoff value of
ρ according to w is identical to the mean-payoff of ρ according to w′. Therefore,
a maximizer winning (resp. optimal) strategy in graph G is a winning (optimal)
strategy also in G′ and vice versa, and the proof of the lemma follows. ⊓⊔
In the next lemma we show that mean-payoff games on direct normalized
bipartite complete graphs are as hard as mean-payoff games on undirected nor-
malized bipartite complete graphs.
Lemma 3 The problem of determining whether maximizer has a winning strat-
egy for a threshold 0 for a mean-payoff games on a directed normalized bipartite
complete graph is as hard as the corresponding problem for mean-payoff games
on an undirected normalized bipartite complete graph
To conclude, by Lemma 1 we get that a polynomial algorithm for alternating
move two-player zero-sum games exists if and only if there exists a polynomial
algorithm for solving mean-payoff games on a complete bipartite undirected
graph, and by Lemmas 2, 1 and 3 and by Theorem 3 we get that the latter
exists if and only if there exists a polynomial algorithm for solving mean-payoff
games on arbitrary (directed) graphs. Hence, the main result of this section
follows.
Theorem 4 There exists a polynomial time algorithm for computing exact equi-
librium for two-player zero-sum (alternating move) games if and only if there
exists a polynomial time algorithm for solving mean-payoff games on graphs.
4 Complexity of Computing Optimal Equilibrium
In this section, we investigate the complexity of computing an optimal equilib-
rium. Our main results are summarized in the next theorem:
Theorem 5 1. Optimal equilibrium can be obtained by a profile of pure strate-
gies.
2. If mean-payoff games are in P, then there is a polynomial algorithm for
computing an exact optimal equilibrium.
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3. If mean-payoff games are not in P, then there is no FPTAS that approximate
the social welfare of the optimal equilibrium.
4. There is an FPTAS to compute an ǫ-equilibrium that is δ-optimal. (Note
that it does not necessarily approximate the value of an exact optimal equi-
librium.)
We will prove Theorem 5 in the next four subsections: In Subsection 4.1
we show the naive algorithm for computing an equilibrium that is based on
Folk Theorem, and we prove basic properties of equilibria in alternating move
games. In Subsection 4.2 we prove Theorem 5(1). In Subsection 4.3 we investi-
gate the complexity of computing the social welfare of the optimal equilibrium,
and prove Theorem 5(2) and Theorem 5(3). Finally, in Subsection 4.4 we prove
Theorem 5(4) which is the main result of this section.
In this section, we will model n-action k-player alternating move games by
a multi-weighted graph, according to the following conventions: The vertices of
the graph are the vertices in the set V = (A1×A2×· · ·×Ak)×{1, . . . , k}, and we
say that player i owns the vertex set Vi = (A1×A2×· · ·×Ak)×{i}. Intuitively,
a vertex is characterized by an action vector and by a player that owns it. The
pair (u, v) is in the edge relation if u is owned by player i, v is owned by player
i+ 1 (where player k + 1 is player 1), and there is at most one difference in the
action vector of u and v and it is in position i. The weight of every edge is a
vector of size k that corresponds to the utility vector of the actions. Formally, if
u = (a1, i) and v = (a2, i+ 1) then w(u, v) = (u1(a2), u2(a2), . . . , uk(a2)).
For an infinite path in the multi-weighted graph we define the dimension
i of mean-payoff vector of the path to be the mean-payoff value of the path
according to dimension i. It is an easy observation that every infinite path in
the graph corresponds to a play and its mean-payoff vector corresponds to the
utility vector of the play. We note that the size of the graph is k2 · nk which is
polynomial in the size of the encoding of the utility functions (which is k · nk),
hence this graph can be constructed in polynomial time.
4.1 Basic properties of equilibria
The Folk Theorem gives a conceptually simple (but inefficient) technique to
construct an equilibrium. Intuitively, an equilibrium is obtained when each of
the players play as if the goal of all the other players is to minimize its utility, and
if one of the players deviates from this strategy, then all the other players switch
to playing according to a strategy that will minimize the utility of the rebellious
player. Formally, let G be the corresponding k-player game graph that models
the alternating move game. For every player i, we consider a zero-sum two-player
mean-payoff game graph Gi in which the maximizer owns player i vertices and
the minimizer owns the other vertices. Let σi be an arbitrary optimal strategy
for the maximizer in graph Gi, let σi be an arbitrary optimal strategy for the
minimizer in Gi, and let νi be the value that is obtained by the strategy profile
(σi, σi). Then if every player i plays according to the strategy:
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If player j 6= i deviated from σj , then play according to σj forever, and
otherwise play according to σi
an equilibrium is formed (since by definition, playing according to σi assures
utility at least νi, and deviating from σi assures utility at most νi).
In the next lemma, we extend the basic principle of Folk Theorem and get
a characterization of all the equilibria that are obtained by a profile of pure
strategies.
Lemma 4 Let (t1, t2, . . . , tk) be a utility vector such that ti ≥ νi (for every
player i), then there exists a pure equilibrium with utility exactly ti for every
player i if and only if there exists an infinite path π in the graph G with mean-
payoff vector (t1, t2, . . . , tk).
4.2 Optimal equilibrium can be obtained by pure strategies
In this subsection, we extend Lemma 4 also for the case of mixed strategies,
and as a consequence we get that optimal equilibrium can be obtained by pure
strategies. Intuitively, we wish to show that if a profile of (mixed) strategies yields
a utility vector (t1, . . . , tk), then there exists an infinite path in the graph with
mean-payoff vector that is greater or equal (in every dimension) to (t1, . . . , tk).
Then we get that if a utility vector is obtained by a profile of mixed strategies,
and then by Lemma 4 it is also obtained by a profile of pure strategies.
We formally prove the above by the next two lemmas.
Lemma 5 Let G be a multi-weighted graph that is strongly connected, and let
(t1, . . . , tk) be a vector. Then if for every α > 0 there exists a (finite) cyclic
path with average weight at least ti −α in every dimension, then there exists an
infinite path with mean-payoff vector at least (t1, . . . , tk).
Lemma 6 Let σ be a profile of (mixed) strategies with utility vector (t1, . . . , tk).
Then for every α > 0 there exists a cyclic path in the game graph with average
weight at least ti − α in every dimension.
We are now ready to prove that the utility vector of a mixed equilibrium can be
obtained by a pure equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Let σ be a profile of mixed strategies that induces a utility vector
(t1, . . . , tk). Then there exists a profile σ
′ of pure strategies that induces exactly
the same utility vector. Moreover, if σ is an equilibrium, then so is σ′.
Proof. By Lemma 6 we get that for every α > 0 there is a cyclic path with
average weight at least ti−α in every dimension. Therefore, by Lemma 5 we get
that there is an infinite path in G with mean-payoff vector at least (t1, . . . , tk),
and by Lemma 4 we get that there is a profile of pure strategies that has utility
at least (t1, . . . , tk). If σ is an equilibrium we get that ti ≥ νi (since otherwise,
player i would deviate to strategy σi), and thus, by Lemma 4, we get that there
is a pure equilibrium that gives the same utility vector. ⊓⊔
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The next corollary immediately follows from Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 (Theorem 5(1)) An optimal equilibrium can be obtained by a
profile of pure strategies.
4.3 The complexity of computing the social welfare of the optimal
(exact) equilibrium
In this section we show that if there is a polynomial algorithm for mean-payoff
games, then there is a polynomial algorithm to compute an optimal equilibrium
in a k-player alternating move games. We also prove the converse direction, that
is, we show that if there is a polynomial algorithm that computes the social
welfare of the optimal equilibrium, then there is a polynomial algorithm that
solves mean-payoff games. We prove these two assertions in the next two lemmas.
Lemma 7 Suppose that mean-payoff games are in P, then there is a polynomial
algorithm that computes the social welfare of an optimal equilibrium.
Proof. Due to Corollary 1, it is enough to consider only pure strategies, and due
to Lemma 4 a vector of utilities (t1, . . . , tk) is obtained by a pure equilibrium if
and only if ti ≥ νi (for i = 1, . . . , k) and there is an infinite path in the game
graph with mean-payoff (t1, . . . , tk). Since we assume that there is a polynomial
algorithm for computing νi, our problem boils down to
Find the maximal value of
∑k
i=1 ti subject to
– ti ≥ νi; and
– there exists an infinite path with mean-payoff vector at least (t1, . . . , tk)
It was shown in [11] (in the proof of Theorem 18) that the problem of deciding
whether there exists an infinite path with mean-payoff vector at least (t1, . . . , tk)
can be reduced (in polynomial time) to a set of linear constraints. Moreover, the
generated set of constraints remain linear even when ti is a variable. Hence, we
can find a feasible threshold vector (t1, . . . , tk) (that is, a vector that is realizable
by an infinite path in the graph) that maximizes
∑k
i=1 ti by linear programming.
Therefore, if we have a polynomial algorithm that computes νi, then we can find
the social welfare of the optimal equilibrium in polynomial time. ⊓⊔
Lemma 7 proves Theorem 5(2) and gives an upper bound to the complexity of
computing optimal equilibrium. In the next lemma we show that this bound is
tight, and that the social welfare of the optimal equilibrium cannot be approxi-
mated, unless mean-payoff games are in P.
Lemma 8 (Theorem 5(3)) There is no FPTAS that approximates the social
welfare of an optimal equilibrium, unless mean-payoff games are in P.
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4.4 An FPTAS to compute an ǫ-equilibrium that is δ-optimal
In this subsection, we assume that the utilities of the players are scaled to ratio-
nals in [−1, 1], and we will describe an algorithm that computes an ǫ-equilibrium
that is δ-optimal (with respect to all ǫ-equilibria) and runs in time complexity
that is polynomial in the input size and in 1
ǫ
and 1
δ
. Subsection 4.3 suggests
that in order to compute a δ-optimal ǫ-equilibrium we should approximate (by
some value) the values of ν1, . . . , νk and then compute the optimal infinite path
(with respect to the sum of utilities) that has utility for player i that is greater
than the approximation of νi. However, this approach would not work, since the
optimal social welfare is not a continuous function with respect to the values
ν1, . . . , νk.
We denote by OPT ǫ the social welfare of the optimal ǫ-equilibrium. We base
our solution on the next lemma, which gives two key properties of OPT ǫ.
Lemma 9 1. If ǫ1 ≥ ǫ2, then OPT ǫ1 ≥ OPT ǫ2 .
2. For every α ∈ [0, 1] and ǫ1, ǫ2 > 0, let ǫ = αǫ1 + (1− α)ǫ2, then there exists
an ǫ-equilibrium with social welfare αOPT ǫ1 + (1− α)OPT ǫ2 .
Proof. The first item of the lemma is a trivial observation. In order to prove
the second item, we observe that by Lemma 4 (and since by Proposition 1 it is
enough to consider only pure equilibria) it is enough to prove that there is an
infinite path π with utility at least νi − ǫ in every dimension and with social
welfare αOPT ǫ1 + (1 − α)OPT ǫ2 . By Proposition 1, it is enough to show that
there is a profile σ of mixed strategies (that need not be an equilibrium) that
has a utility at least ν − ǫ in every dimension and has a social welfare at least
αOPT ǫ1 +(1−α)OPT ǫ2 . The construction of σ is trivial. For i = 1, 2, let σǫi be
a profile of strategies that induces an ǫi-optimal equilibrium, then we construct
σ by playing according to σǫ1 with probability α and playing according to σǫ2
with probability 1− α. ⊓⊔
Corollary 2 For every ζ ≤ ǫδ4k we have OPT ǫ+ζ −
δ
2 ≤ OPT ǫ ≤ OPT ǫ+ζ
By the above corollary, to approximate OPT ǫ, it is enough to approximate by
δ
2 the value of OPT ǫ+ζ for some ζ ≤
ǫδ
4k . For this purpose, we extend the notion
of ǫ-equilibrium also for k-dimensional vectors, and we say that a profile of
strategies is a β-equilibrium if player i cannot improve its utility by at least
βi. Let us denote by minβ and by maxβ the minimal and maximal element of
β (respectively). Then by definition, OPTminβ ≤ OPT β ≤ OPTmaxβ , and by
Corollary 2 we get that OPTβ ≤ OPTmaxβ ≤ OPT β + (max β −minβ) ·
4k
ǫ
.
We are now ready to present an FPTAS that computes a δ-approximation
for OPT ǫ: (1) Set ζ =
ǫδ
4k , and compute a ζ approximation of νi for every player
i, and denote it by ri. (2) Compute the optimal path π (with respect to social
welfare) that has utility at least ri− (ǫ−ζ) for every player, and return its social
welfare.
We note that we can execute the first step of the algorithm in polynomial
time due to [10](Observation 3.1), and we can execute the second step in polyno-
mial time by solving the linear programming problem that we described in the
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proof of Lemma 7. The next lemma proves the correctness of our approximation
algorithm.
Lemma 10 Let S(π) be the social welfare of π. Then S(π)− δ ≤ OPT ǫ ≤ S(π)
Lemma 10 along with the complexity analysis that we provided, proves that there
is an FPTAS to compute an ǫ-equilibrium that is δ-optimal, and Theorem 5(4)
follows. We also note that our proof for Theorem 5(4) gives a constructive (and
polynomial) algorithm that computes a description of an actual ǫ-equilibrium
that is δ-optimal.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We show that for a given directed normalized bipartite complete graph
G = (V,E,w) we can construct (in polynomial time) an undirected normalized
bipartite complete graph G′ = (V ′, E′, w′) such that maximizer has a winning
strategy in G (for threshold 0) if and only if he has a winning strategy in G′
(again for threshold 0). Informally, we build G′ from G by taking the same set
of vertices and by assigning a weight w′(u, v) that matches either to w(u, v) or
to w(v, u).
To formally construct w′ we present the notion of surely loosing edges. Recall
that V1 are maximizer vertices and V2 are minimizer vertices. We say that a
maximizer vertex out-edge (v1, v2) is surely loosing for maximizer if w(v1, v2) +
w(v2, v1) < 0. We claim that if maximizer has a winning strategy, then all
its memoryless winning strategies do not contain surely loosing edges. That is,
for every memoryless winning strategy σ and a surely loosing edge (v1, v2) we
have σ(v1) 6= (v1, v2). Indeed, towards contradiction let us assume that σ(v1) =
(v1, v2), and recall that G is a complete bipartite graph, than for the minimizer
strategy τ that leads from every minimizer vertex to v1 we have that the mean-
payoff value of (σ, τ) is w(v1,v2)+w(v2,v1)2 < 0, in contradiction to the assumption
that σ is a winning strategy. Analogously, (v2, v1) is a surely loosing edge for
minimizer if w(v1, v2) + w(v2, v1) ≥ 0 and by the same arguments there is no
memoryless winning strategy for minimizer that contains a surely loosing edge.
We are now ready to formally define G′ = (V ′, E′, w′). We define V ′ = V ,
and since G′ is complete bipartite the definition of E′ follows immediately. For
an edge {v1, v2} ∈ E
′, where vi ∈ Vi, we define
w′(v1, v2) =
{
w(v1, v2) if w(v1, v2) + w(v2, v1) ≥ 0
w(v2, v1) otherwise (if w(v1, v2) + w(v2, v1) < 0)
We first prove that if σ is a memoryless winning strategy for maximizer in
G, then it is also a winning strategy in G′. Indeed, let ρ be a path (in G and
in G′) that is consistent with σ. We claim that for every path π that is a finite
prefix of ρ we have w(π) ≤ w′(π) (that is, its weight in G′ is not less than
its weight in G), and we prove it by a simple induction on the length of π.
For |π| = 0 the claim is trivial. For |π| > 0 let (u, v) be the last edge in π.
If u ∈ V1, then we get that σ(u) = (u, v) and therefore (u, v) is not a surely
loosing edge. Therefore, by definition, w(u, v) = w′(u, v) and the claim follows
by the induction hypothesis (since it holds for the prefix of length |π| − 1). If
u ∈ V2, then since G is normalized we have that w(u, v) < 0 and w(v, u) > 0.
Therefore, by definition, w′(u, v) ≥ w(u, v), and by the induction hypothesis the
claim follows. Since σ is a winning strategy we get that the mean-payoff value
of ρ is non-negative according to w, and by the last claim we get that the mean-
payoff of ρ according to w′ is greater or equal to the mean-payoff value according
to w. Hence σ is a winning strategy for maximizer also in G′.
13
By the same arguments we get that if minimizer has a memoryless winning
strategy in G, then the same strategy is winning for minimizer also in G′.
Finally, due to Theorem 1, we get that maximizer has a winning strategy in
G if and only if he has a memoryless winning strategy in G if and only if he has
a memoryless winning strategy in G′ if and only if it has a winning strategy in
G′ and the proof of the lemma follows. ⊓⊔
B Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. The direction from left to right is trivial, since a profile of pure strategies
has a (unique) infinite path in the graph that is consistent with the strategies.
To prove the converse direction we introduce the notion of a path strategy and
the notion of path equilibrium. For a path π we define the path strategy for player
i to be: at round j (which is a player i round), play according to the j-th edge in
π. And we define the strategy σπi to be: If player j 6= i deviated from the path
strategy of π, then play forever according to σj , and otherwise play according to
the path strategy of π. The path equilibrium of the infinite path π is the profile
(σπ1 , . . . , σ
π
k ). The profile is an equilibrium since it assures a utility ti ≥ νi for
every player, and if player i deviates from the strategy σπi he will end up with a
utility νi. ⊓⊔
C Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. We assume that for every α > 0 there exists a finite cyclic path Cα with
average weight at least ti − α in every dimension, and we let vα be an arbitrary
vertex in the cycle Cα. For every two vertices u and v, we denote by πu,v the
shortest path from u to v (recall that G is strongly connected), and we denote by
W the size of the biggest weight (in absolute value) in G. Intuitively, we obtain
an infinite path with mean-payoff vector at least (t1, . . . , tn) by following the
cycle Cα for α = 1, and then we follow the path πvα,vα
2
and we follow the cycle
Cα
2
twice, and then we follow Cα
3
three times and so on. However, we have to
make sure that the average payoff does not decrease too much when following a
cycle for the first time.
Formally, for every i ∈ N, we denote by Li the length of the cycle C 1
i
, and by
mi = iWLi+1. We define ρ0 to be the empty path, and for every i > 0 we define
ρi = ρi−1πv 1
i−1
,v 1
i
Cmi1
i
, and we define ρ to be the infinite path that is the limit
of the sequence ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρi, . . . . Due to the fact that the length of πv 1
i−1
,v 1
i
is
bounded (by the size of the graph), and since the maximal weight is at most W
(and the minimal weight is at least −W ), we get, by a simple algebra, that the
mean-payoff vector of ρ is at least (t1, . . . , tk). ⊓⊔
D Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. By definition of the utility function, for every δ > 0, there exists a round
j such that the expected average utility, in every round after j, is at least ti−δ in
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every dimension. We denote byΠj the (finite) set of paths with length j that have
non-zero probability according to the strategy profile σ, and w.l.o.g we assume
that all the paths have the same probability (and a path may occur more than
once in Πj). For a path π ∈ Πj , we denote by Cπ the longest cyclic path that is
a sub-path of π. We note that since G is a finite graph, we get that |Cπ | ≥ |π| −
2|G| (where |G| denotes the number of vertices in G), and in every dimension:
w(Cπ) ≥ w(π)−2|G|W and Avg(Cπ) ≥ Avg(π)−
2|G|W
|π|−2|G|W = Avg(π)−
2|G|W
j−2|G|W .
We partition Πj to |G| sets (some of them may be empty) namely Π
v
j for every
v ∈ G, such that for every path π ∈ Πvj we have that v is in the cyclic path Cπ .
For a set Πvj = {π1, . . . , πm}, we denote C(Π
v
j ) = Cπ1Cπ2 . . . Cπm (note that
C(Πvj ) is a path). For every two vertices u, v ∈ G, we denote by πu,v the shortest
path between u and v, and we note that |πu,v| ≤ |G| and w(πu,v) ≥ −|G|W in
every dimension. Finally, we assume that the vertex set of G is V = {v1, . . . , vm}
and we define the cyclic path
π = C(Πv1j )πv1,v2C(Π
v2
j )πv2,v3 . . . πvm−1,vmC(Π
vm
j )πvm,v1
The average weight of π in every dimension is at least
Avg(Πj)−
3|G|2W
j
and since in every dimension Avg(Πj) ≥ ti − δ, then for j ≥
3|G|2W
δ
we get that
in every dimension
Avg(π) ≥ ti − 2δ
and for δ = α2 we get that π is a cyclic path with average weight at least ti − α
in every dimension, and the proof of the lemma follows. ⊓⊔
E Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. Due to Theorem 2 and Theorem 4 it is enough to show that if we could
approximate the social welfare of the optimal equilibrium in a three-player game,
then we would be able to determine whether in a two-player zero-sum game,
player 1 has a strategy that assures a value that is strictly greater than 0. The
proof is straight forward. Let (A1, A2) be the actions of a zero-sum two-player
game with utility functions u1 : A1 ×A2 → [−1, 1] and u2 = −u1. We construct
a three-player game (A′1, A
′
2, A
′
3, u
′
1, u
′
2, u
′
3) in the following way:
– A′1 = A1 ∪ {$}, A
′
2 = A2 ∪ {$} and A
′
3 = {$} (where $ is a fresh action).
– Let a∗2 be an arbitrary action in A
′
2 − {$}. We define the utility function u
′
1
to be
u′1(a1, a2, a3) =


u1(a1, a2) if a1 6= $ and a2 6= $
u1(a1, a
∗
2) if a1 6= $ and a2 = $
0 otherwise (if a1 = $)
We define u′2 = −u
′
1, and
u′3(a1, a2, a3) =
{
1 if a1 = $
−1 otherwise (if a1 6= $)
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The reader can verify that if player 1 has a strategy to assure utility greater than
0 in the zero-sum game, then in any profile of equilibrium in the three-player
game he will play $ only for a negligible number of rounds, and the social welfare
of the equilibrium will be −1. On the other hand, if player 1 cannot assure utility
at least 0, then a profile of strategies in which all three players play $ forever
is an equilibrium and its social welfare is 1. Hence, even for ǫ = 1 we cannot
approximate the social welfare of the optimal equilibrium, unless mean-payoff
games are in P. ⊓⊔
F Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. The fact that OPT ǫ ≤ OPT ǫ+ζ follows immediately from Lemma 9(1).
To prove that OPT ǫ+ζ − δ ≤ OPT ǫ, we set α =
ζ
ǫ
and by Lemma 9(2), and
since αζ + (1− α)(ǫ + ζ) = ǫ we get
αOPT ζ + (1− α)OPT ǫ+ζ ≤ OPT ǫ
since the utility function is scaled to [−1, 1] we get that OPT ζ ≥ −k and
OPT ǫ+ζ ≤ k, and thus we have
−2kα+OPT ǫ+ζ ≤ OPT ǫ
since α = ζ
ǫ
we get
−2kζ
ǫ
+OPT ǫ+ζ ≤ OPT ǫ
and since ζ ≤ ǫδ4k we have
OPT ǫ+ζ −
δ
2
≤ OPT ǫ
⊓⊔
G Proof of Lemma 10
Proof. We denote player-i utility according to π by ui(π) and we construct the
vector β by defining
βi =
{
νi − ui(π) if νi − ui(π) ≥ (ǫ−
ζ
2 )
ǫ− ζ2 otherwise
and we claim that π is an optimal β-equilibrium. The claim holds because for
every β-equilibrium, the utility of player i is at least νi − (ǫ − ζ), and π is the
optimal path with utility at least νi−(ǫ−ζ) for every player. In addition, we claim
that max β −minβ is at most ζ2 . The claim holds because by the construction
of β we have that minβ ≥ ǫ − ζ2 , and νi − ui(π) is at most ǫ − ζ (since π is an
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(ǫ − ζ)-equilibrium). Hence maxβ −minβ ≤ ζ2 . Therefore, since max β ≤ ǫ and
since
OPTβ ≤ OPTmaxβ ≤ OPT β + (max β −min β) ·
4k
ǫ
we get that
S(π) ≤ OPT ǫ ≤ S(π) +
ζ
2
·
4k
ǫδ
and since ζ = ǫδ4k we get that
S(π) ≤ OPT ǫ ≤ S(π) +
δ
2
and the assertion of the lemma follows. ⊓⊔
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